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COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND THE HOMESTEAD
The Texas Family Code gives each spouse the right to sole management, control, and disposition of his or her separate property."' The
statute does not change the husband's power of management over his
separate property, since he has possessed the right to manage, control,
and dispose of the separate property since 1848.701 The effect of this
equalization process is to enable the wife to convey her separate real
property without any statutory restraints of joinder or privy acknowledgment.
CHANGES IN COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW

The various changes that have evolved in this area of law present
some problems in researching land titles. For example, prior to 1913
700. TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 5.21 (1975). Sections 5.21 and 5.22 divide the marital estate into 1) separately owned property subject to the control of the owning spouse,
2) community property subject to the control of the spouse who would have owned it
if he or she would have remained single and 3) mixed community property subject to
the joint control and disposition of both spouses. Id. §§ 5.21, 5.22. A spouse's separate
property consists of 1) the property owned or claimed by each spouse before marriage;
2) the property acquired by the spouse during marriage by gift, devise, or descent, and
3) the recovery for personal injuries sustained by the spouse during marriage, except any
recovery for loss of earning capacity during marriage. Id. § 5.01(a).
The basic concept of the community property system is one of equality. Under this
system, the wife's interest in the marital estate equals that of her husband. Rompel v.
United States, 59 F. Supp. 483, 486 (W.D. Tex. 1945), rev'd on other grounds, 326 U.S.
367 (1945); Leyva v. Rodriguez, 195 S.W.2d 704, 707 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Still, 163 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1942, writ ref'd). The status of equality between the spouses is based
on the contribution that each spouse makes to the marriage. Each spouse owns a present, vested, undivided, one-half interest in all property acquired by onerous title during
the marriage. See Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231, 239 (5th
Cir. 1958); Rompel v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 483, 486-87 (W.D. Tex.), rev'd on
other grounds, 326 U.S. 367 (1945). With respect to the gains made and the losses
suffered during the marriage relationship, the husband and wife become partners. See
United States v. Stapf, 309 F.2d 592, 600 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 375
U.S. 118 (1963); Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231, 239 (5th Cir.
1958); Rompel v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 483, 487 (W.D. Tex. 1945), rev'd on other
grounds, 326 U.S. 367 (1945).
701. The husband was traditionally recognized as the sole authorized manager of all
the community assets. United States v. Stapf, 309 F.2d 592, 600 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd
on other grounds, 375 U.S. 118 (1963); Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259
F.2d 231, 239 (5th Cir. 1958); see Kreuger v. Williams, 163 Tex. 545, 548, 359 S.W.2d
48, 50 (1962); Martin v. McAllister, 94 Tex. 567, 570, 63 S.W. 624, 625 (1901); Tex.
Laws 1913, ch. 32, § 1, at 61; Tex. Laws 1848, ch. 79, § 2, at 77, 3 H. GAMMEL, LAWS
OF TEXAS 77 (1898). The few restraints placed on the husband required that his dealings with the community estate be beneficial and not in fraud of the wife's interests.
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the husband could convey his wife's separate real property, but he was

required to obtain his wife's participation, as well as her privy acknowledgment, to prevent any implication of fraud on her interests.70 2 The
wife was required to be examined, apart from her husband, by a judge
or notary public and to declare her willingness to sign the deed. 0 3
Therefore, any such deed executed prior to 1913 which did not fulfill
these requirements creates a cloud on the subsequent titles in that
chain.
Also in 1913 the Texas Legislature adopted a system of divided

management of the community estate, giving the wife a measure of
control over the community. The wife was authorized to manage her
earnings, her separate estate, and the income from her separate property.7" 4 The husband's joinder was still required, however, in a conveyance by the wife of this property. 05 This formality could be

avoided, however, if the wife applied for and was granted a court order
granting her permission to convey the property without her husband's
joinder.70 6 Thus, any conveyance by a wife of her separate property
made between the years 1914 to 1951 which does not reflect either

the joinder of the husband or a court order dispensing with that requirement also creates a cloud in the chain.
In 1957 the Texas Legislature enacted a statute giving married
women complete power to manage their separate property provided
they complied with certain statutory provisions.70 7 In order to convey
her separate real property under this statute the wife had to be 21 years
Krueger v. Williams, 163 Tex. 545, 548, 359 S.W.2d 48, 50 (1962); Coss v. Coss, 207
S.W. 127, 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1918, no writ).
702. Stone v. Sledge, 87 Tex. 49, 54, 26 S.W. 1068, 1070 (1894); Zimpleman v. Portwood, 107 S.W. 584, 585 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, writ ref'd).
703. 2 PASCH. DIG. art. 1003, at 261 (1870). Stone v. Sledge, 87 Tex. 49, 26 S.W.
1068 (1894) reveals the problems that arose when this procedure was not followed properly. In a trespass to try title action, Mrs. Stone and her husband sought to recover
a tract of land which was her separate property. The notary had attached a certificate
to the deed which was materially defective and insufficient to convey the wife's title.
The supreme court stated that "a deed in the name of the husband alone may purport
to convey property which . . . belongs to the wife . . . but it purports to convey it as
his own, and not as her property." Id. at 54, 26 S.W. at 1070 (1894).
704. Tex. Laws 1913, ch. 32, § 1, at 61, codified in TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 5.21
(1975); see, e.g., Farm & Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Abernathy, 129 Tex. 379, 102
S.W.2d 410 (1937); Whitney Hardware Co. v. McMahan, 111 Tex. 242, 231 S.W. 694
(1921).
705. See, e.g., Cauble v. Beaver-Electra Ref. Co., 115 Tex. 1, 274 S.W. 120 (1925);
Gohlman, Lester, & Co. v. Whittle, 114 Tex. 548, 273 S.W. 808 (1925); Arnold v.
Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925); Tex. Laws 1913, ch. 32, § 1, at 61-62,
codified in TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 5.21 (1975).
706. See Tex. Laws 1913, ch. 32, § 1, at 61-62, codified in TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN.
§ 5.21 (1975).
707. Tex. Laws 1957, ch. 407, § 1, at 1233 (article 4614).
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of age and file a statement with the county clerk stating that she
70 8
wished to have sole control of her separate property.
Further legislative reform was effected in 1963 and resulted in
several important changes in the law regarding conveyances by a married woman. For example, in Diamond v. Borenstein711 the supreme
court interpreted the new amendments as having expressly repealed
the statutory requirement for the wife's separate acknowledgment and
having granted her full power to contract and convey her separate
property without the husband's joinder and without filing a statement
710
of her election to do so.
The Matrimonial Property Act of 1967 and its codification into the
Family Code of 1970 represent the most sweeping of all recent reforms regarding the married woman's power to manage her own separate property. As a result of these revisions, the married woman has
the right not only to full management and control of her separate
711
property, but also to manage her special community property.
Special Community Property

The status of the law regarding the wife's affirmative management
powers over her special community remained uncertain until 1968.712
As a result of the reform movements of 1967, however, the problems
related to the wife's ability to convey her special community were
solved. In 1968, the wife could validly convey her special community
real property without her husband's joinder. 713 The Matrimonial Property Act of 1967 was subsequently codified into the Family Code of
1970, and today each spouse has the power to convey his or her special
714
community property.
708. Id. Article 4614(d) stated: a married woman 21 years of age or over may
file with the county clerk of the county of which she is a resident, a duly acknowledged
statement that she thereby elects to have sole management, control, and disposition of
her separate property.
709. 410 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1966), writ refd per curiam, 414
S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1967).
710. Id. at 460. Prior to the reform legislation of 1963, failure to adhere to the privy
acknowledgment statute made the transaction a nullity. See Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v.
Downey, 143 Tex. 191, 183 S.W.2d 426 (1944).
711. TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. §§ 5.21-5.22 (1975).
712. Quilliam, Gratuitous Transfers of Community Property to Third Persons, 2
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 23, 24 (1970).
713. Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 309, § 1, at 738, codified in TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN.
§ 5.22 (1975). The term special community property was used in Moss v. Gibbs, 370
S.W.2d 452, 454-55 (Tex. 1963).
714. TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 5.22 (1975). The most immediate result of section
5.22 is to reduce the husband's power over control, disposition, and management of the
community property.
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Before 1913, Texas statutes granted the husband the power of
management and control over the community, as well as the wife's separate property. 71 ' In 1913 the Texas Legislature gave the wife the
management of her special community property, consisting of her personal earnings and income from her separate property.7 16 This control
was rescinded in 1925, but the wife's ability to manage her special
community was inferred by other statutory provisions. These provisions were Article 4616 of the Revised Civil Statutes 717 which exempted the wife's special community from liability for debts incurred
by her husband, and article 4621718 which implied that the special community was liable for the wife's contracts. Although these statutes impliedly granted the wife some control over her special community property, it was still unclear how this property could be conveyed. Article
4619 stated that "[d]uring coverture the common property of the
husband and wife may be disposed of by the husband only. '7 10 Considering the special community as common property, the only logical
solution would be to require the joinder of the husband in the conveyance of the wife's special community real property.
After 1963 a married woman had legal capacity to convey her separate property. 720 The problem still remained, however, whether the
wife could solely convey her special community real property. If the
wife sought to convey her special community real property to a third
person, she would be best advised to seek her husband's joinder.
Prior to the 1967 reforms, the Texas courts had stated that the
special community property was under the wife's exclusive control. 72 1
Most of the cases dealt, however, with a creditor of the husband attempting to levy on the wife's special community property for payment
of his debt and no specific reference to the wife's affirmative management powers over her special community property was made. 722
Joint Community Property

The reform amendments of 1967 provided that joint community
715. Huie, Commentary on the Community Property Law of Texas, 13 TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. 1, 39 (1960).

716. Tex. Laws 1913, ch. 32, § 1, at 61.
717. Tex.
718. TEX.
719. Tex.
720. Tex.

Laws 1957, ch. 407, § 2, at 1234.

REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.

art. 4621 (1957).

Laws 1959, ch. 404, § 1, at 881.
Laws 1963, ch. 472, § 1, at 1188.

721. See, e.g., Moss v. Gibbs, 370 S.W.2d 452, 455 (Tex. 1963).
722. See, e.g., Bearden v. Knight, 149 Tex. 108, 112, 228 S.W.2d 837, 844 (1950);

Hawkins v. Britton State Bank, 122 Tex. 69, 74, 52 S,W.2d 243, 245 (1932).
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property would come under the joint management, control, and disposition of both spouses.725 If community property subject to the sole
management of one spouse is commingled with community property
subject to the management of the other spouse, it becomes "mixed"

community property, subject to joint management. Joint management
of community property also includes the property produced by the joint
efforts of the spouses in a common endeavor. 2
Certain problems have arisen in construing the phrase "joint management, control, and disposition," especially in the context of the

alienation of mixed community property.

The controlling issue be-

came whether both spouses were required to participate in the transfer
of the mixed community, or whether a "joint manager" could transfer

a part of the mixed community without the joinder of his co-manager.
The possibility of considering the spouses tenants in common was examined: 725 one tenant in common may not convey the joint property

without the authority of the other.726 Another suggested analogy was
to the law of partnership. Under this situation each marital partner
would be considered the agent of the other with each partner having
the power to convey. The supreme court considered these options in
Cooper v. Texas Gulf Industries, Inc.727 and held that the doctrine of
virtual representation 728 had been abolished by the new Family Code:
section 5.22 had taken away the husband's sole right to manage all of
729
the community property.

When joint management community property is involved, the
husband and wife are now joint managers. The wife is her husband's equal with respect to management; she
730 stands in the same

position as any other joint owner of property.

723. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 4621 (1967), codified in TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN.
§ 5.22 (1975).
724. See Smith v. Strahan, 16 Tex. 314, 324 (1856); Logan v. Logan, 112 S.W.2d
515, 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-Anfarillo 1937, writ dism'd).
725. See Rogan v. Williams & Co., 63 Tex. 123, 129 (1885); McClain v. Holder,
279 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
726. See McClain v. Holder, 279 S.W.2d 105, 109 (Tex. Civ. App-Galveston
1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
727. 513 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1974).
728. The basis for virtual representation is the husband's power of sole management
of the entire community. Under this doctrine, a suit naming only the husband as a
party is nevertheless binding on the wife. Starr v. Schoellkopf Co., 131 Tex. 263, 265,
113 S.W.2d 1227, 1228 (1938); Gabb v. Boston, 109 Tex. 26, 30, 193 S.W. 137, 138
(1917); Jergens v. Schiele, 61 Tex. 255, 258 (1884); Cooley v. Miller, 228 S.W. 1085,
1086 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921, jdgmt adopted).
729. Cooper v. Texas Gulf Indus., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Tex. 1974).

730. Id. at 202.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

5

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 7 [2022], No. 1, Art. 10

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:58

Nevertheless, it is still undetermined whether both spouses must join
in the conveyance of joint management community property.
Protection of Third Parties

The Family Code has created presumptions protecting third parties
who deal with either spouse."' Section 5.24(a) provides that when
a spouse takes a deed in his or her name alone, that property is pre73 2
sumed to be subject to that spouse's sole management and control.
A third party may rely on that presumption as long as he has no notice
to the contrary, and he is not a party to a fraud on the other spouse." 3
Despite the language in section 5.22 providing for joint control, this
presumption could allow one spouse to dispose of mixed community
or the special community property of the other spouse without the
knowledge or joinder of the other. As long as a third party grantee
has no knowledge that title is in the non-consenting spouse, he would
be an innocent purchaser. If title to the joint community property is
in both spouses, however, the question would then become whether the
conveyance is void or is valid as to the one-half interest of the conveying spouse.
The Family Code of Texas represents an orderly and equitable legislative reform. Further classification is needed, however, in the area
of joint control. Ambiguous circumstances involving the alienation of
joint community property will result until more precise definitions of
joint management and its functioning are forthcoming.
THE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION

The purpose of the homestead exemption is to secure the family
home. 3 The homestead is not an estate in land but is a personal
right 3 5 established by constitutional and statutory provisions.73 6 Since
731. TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 5.24 (1975).
732. Id. § 5.24(a).
733. Id. § 5.24(b). In unilaterally disposing of joint community property or special
community property of the other spouse, as between the spouses, there may be a pre-

sumption of fraud. See Krueger v. Williams, 163 Tex. 545, 548, 359 S.W.2d 48, 50
(1962).
Because of the husband's sole right to manage the community property prior to 1967,

however, a bona fide purchaser could safely accept a deed from the husband alone. See,
e.g., Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 473, 98 S.W.2d 346, 347 (1936).
734. See Cocke v. Conquest, 120 Tex. 43, 53, 35 S.W.2d 673, 678 (1931).

735. See Roberson v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 147 S;W.2d 949, 953 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1941, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.); Middleton v. Johnston, 110 S.W. 789, 791
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1845 all Texas constitutions have contained a provision forbidding a
73 7
married man to alienate the homestead without his wife's consent.
Specific Performanceand the Wife's Contractto
Convey the Homestead
Prior to the effective date of the Texas Family Code the wife could,
by virtue of a statutory requirement of a privy acknowledgment by her
to any conveyance of the homestead, retract or repudiate a contract for
sale by refusing to sign the necessary deed. 78 Specific performance
would not be granted to enforce a contract executed by both the husband and wife to convey the homestead property. 739 The general rule
was that an executory contract to convey the homestead was not enforceable because it did not constitute a joint conveyance. Thus, even
if the wife joined in the contract of sale, it was not enforceable unless
740
she also executed the required privy acknowledgment of the deed.
The original requirements for the conveyance of the homestead were
profoundly affected by the wife's inability to contract. Article 1300
required the wife to join in the conveyance, sign the instrument and
perform a separate acknowledgment. 741 The statutory procedure of
the privy acknowledgment provided that the instrument of conveyance
be shown and fully explained to the wife. She was required to be apart
from her husband, and while signing, she was to state that she did not
wish to retract her consent.7 42 Prior to the privy acknowledgment and
the wife's statement that she did not wish to retract, the wife could
repudiate any executory contract for the conveyance of the homestead, 743 and the contract to convey was not sufficient as a basis for
compelling the transfer of the property: "[t]he sole and only mode
prescribed by statute is by 'conveyance,' in which she joins the hus-

band, and.

. .

acknowledges privily and apart from him.

'744

In 1968 the legislature repealed the statutory requirements for the
(Tex. Civ. App. 1908, writ ref'd).
736. Gann v. Montgomery, 210 S.W.2d 255, 257-58 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

737. TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 22 (1845).
738.

See Jones v. Goff, 63 Tex. 248 (1885).

739. Id. at 254-55.
740. Id. at 254-55.

741. Tex. Laws 1897, at 41, 10 H.

GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAs 1095 (1897).
742. Tex. Laws 1846, at 156, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TExAs 1462 (1846).

form of the acknowledgment was set out in article 6608. Id.
743. Jones v. Goff, 63 Tex. 248, 254-55 (1885).
744. Id. at 255 (court's emphasis).
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wife's privy acknowledgment.74 5 The supreme court, in Allen v.
Monk,7 46 interpreted this as terminating the wife's statutory privilege
to retract her consent as long as she had not given her separate acknowledgment. The court reasoned that there was "no longer any
validity to the prohibition of specific performance of an executory contract to sell a homestead. . . -747 Further, the supreme court noted
that a recent amendment to article 4618 had eliminated the requirement that the homestead be transferred only by joint conveyance, requiring merely "that both spouses join in any disposition of the homestead. ' 748 Although the supreme court failed to explain the difference
between "joint conveyance" and "joint disposition," or "joinder," the
opinion of the court of civil appeals in Allen suggests that the latter
term means that the consent of the wife may be indicated merely by
her signature.749 Because Section 5.81 of the Family Code requires
only "joinder," the separate acknowledgement of the wife is no longer
necessary. 5 0 With the elimination of this requirement the wife may
not retract her consent, and the executory contract to sell the homestead becomes binding.
JoinderIn Conveyance
One of the most significant cases concerning the failure to comply
with the new requirement of joinder in the conveyance of the homestead is Marler v. Handy.751 The Marlers owned a community property homestead which Mr. Marler conveyed to Handy without his wife's
consent or joinder. She had refused to sign the deed and continued
to claim the property as her homestead. Mr. Marler subsequently purchased other property and moved with his wife and family to this new
location. Mrs. Marler left the original property reluctantly, continued
to claim it as her home, and intended to return. She tried to persuade
her husband to bring suit to recover the property, but he refused. The
supreme court upheld the conveyance, however, on the grounds that
the husband, acting in good faith, may select the homestead of the
family; and that when he has acquired a new home, and his wife
745. Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 309, § 6, at 73.5 (repealing articles 6605, 1300, 6608).
746. 505 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. 1974).

747. Id. at 525.
748. Id. at 525.
749. Allen v. Monk, 498 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973),
S.W.2d 523 (Tex. 1974).
750. TEXAs FAMmY CODE ANN. § 5.81 (1975).

rev'd, 505

751. 88 Tex. 421, 31 S.W. 636 (1895).
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has removed with him to the newly-acquired homestead, a deed
made by him without her concurrence, to the former homestead,
becomes operative as to the752husband as an estoppel against his
right to recover the property.
Thus, a conveyance by the husband of the family homestead without
the wife's consent is not absolutely void; it is merely inoperative. It
becomes operative if the wife fails to bring suit to set aside the deed
75
and moves with her husband to a new homestead. 1
This decision, although still the law, should be re-examined. 5
Conveyance of the homestead by the husband without his wife's consent should now be considered void. This would protect the wife
"against the improvidence of the husband" and would better reflect the
intent of the law.
In determining whether the husband may convey an abandoned
family homestead, the nature of the property is the deciding factor.
When the family homestead is joint community property and is abandoned as the homestead, the relevant question becomes whether the
husband may convey it alone or whether he must obtain his wife's
joinder. As in the conveyance of any other joint community property,
if one spouse conveys without the joinder of the other, the transaction
may be considered void. On the other hand, there is the possibility
that the conveyance may be enforced as to the conveying spouse's community interest. Therefore, the non-joining spouse may thereby retain
his or her joint community interest.
Abandonment of the Homestead
Generally there are only three ways in which the homestead status
can be lost-by death, abandonment, or alienation.7 55 In Marler the
wife did not join in the conveyance of the homestead, nor did she actually abandon it. There are two elements of abandonment-a discontinuance of the use of the property plus the intention that the discontinued use be permanent. 750 Mrs. Marler did cease to use the original
752. Id. at 427, 31 S.W. at 639; accord, Julian v. Andrews, 491 S.W.2d 721, 72627 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
753. Marler v. Handy, 88 Tex. 421, 427, 31 S.W. 636, 639 (1895).
754. Under circumstances similar to Marler, it could be argued that each spouse may
claim a homestead. There is no reason why the wife, if she does not consent, should
move with her husband and lose the original homestead right. The husband should
thereby be allowed to claim the new property for homestead purposes.
755. Posey v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 55 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932,

jdgmt adopted).
756. Archibald v. Jacobs, 69 Tex. 248, 251, 6 S.W. 177, 178 (1887).
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homestead, but she had no intention of doing so permanently.757 It
appears then from this decision that a wife may lose her homestead
merely by moving involuntarily from one homestad to another.75 8
It is also established that when a husband and wife move from one
residence to another without selling the old residence, such removal
does not necessarily constitute an abandonment of the old residence
as their homestead. 759 The family may live at this new location for
a number of years without losing their homestead rights in the original
tract.760 Whether the original residence remains the homestead has
traditionally depended primarily on the husband's intention, since he
was the head of the family. 761 Therefore, removal from the original
property, combined with the husband's intention never to return and
use it for homestead purposes, has usually constituted an abandonment
762
of the old residence.
In 1973 the Texas Constitution was amended to require that the
abandonment of the homestead be done only with consent of both
spouses. 76 Thus it would appear that in a fact situation similar to that
in Marler the original homestead should retain that status. The logical
solution in this type of situation is to make a husband who abandons
and sells the family homestead without the joinder of his wife liable to
the purchaser for damages on the void conveyance.
Encumbrances

An encumbrance may be placed on the homestead only by joinder
of both spouses, 764 and unless the mortgage or encumbrance is for the
purchase price, improvements, or ad valorem taxes, it is void. 765 Embodied within mortgage contracts are provisions which protect not only
757. Marler v. Handy, 88 Tex. 421, 424, 31 S.W. 636, 637 (1895).
758. See also Major v. Loy, 155 S.W.2d 617, 623 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1941,

no writ) ("selling a home and moving from it is an abandonment as a matter of law.").
759. Smith v. Little, 217 S.W.2d 881, 882 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1949, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
760. Coyel v. Mortgage Bond Co., 124 S.W.2d 204, 206 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco

1939, no writ).
761. Id. at 206.
762. Smith v. Uzzell, 61 Tex. 220, 221 (1884); Metts v. Waits, 8 S.W.2d 569, 571
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1928, no writ).
763. Tax. CONST. art. XVI, § 50. For an illustration of the law prior to the consti-

tutional amendment see Bishop v. Williams, 223 S.W. 512, 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1920, writ ref'd).

764. TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 5.81 (1975).
765. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (1887); see, e.g. Hufstedler v. Glenn, 82 S.W.2d
733, 734 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1935, no writ).
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the interest of the homestead claimants but also those of the creditor
mortgagee. These contracts usually contain a disclaimer of the homestead property and an indication by the mortgagor of which property
76 0
is, in fact, homestead.
There are three situations, however, in which it has been alleged that
a debtor may be estopped from claiming the homestead exemption:
(1) if the homestead claimants own only one piece of property which
is being used as their homestead at the time it is mortgaged; 76 7 (2)
if the homestead claimants own more than one piece of property at the
time of the mortgage, but only one could be their homestead as a matter
of law; 768 and (3) if the homestead claimants own more than one piece
of property which has been occupied and used as a homestead. 769 The
first situation is the least complicated. Under these circumstances, the
Texas courts have consistently held that the husband and wife are not
estopped from claiming the homestead exemption regardless of their
contrary statements in the mortgage contract. 770 This is based on the
rationale that the mortgagee should be charged with knowledge of the
actual possession and use of the property as homestead by the family. 771 If the mortgaged property is the only property owned by the
husband and wife at the time of the mortgage, it becomes their homestead as a matter of law.7 72 The homestead claimants are bound by
the constitution, their declarations to the contrary notwithstanding. 773
The case of Texas Land & Loan Co. v. Blalock7 7 1 illustrates the
second situation. In that case, the husband and wife executed a deed
of trust to their homestead property. The deed of trust included a
declaration that the premises had never been used or occupied by the
766. See Comment, Intentions, Mortgages and the Homestead Exemption: A Matter
of Estoppel, 24 BAYLOR L. REv. 187, 188 (1972).
767. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Bennett, 138 Tex. 56, 156 S.W.2d 504 (1943); Nixon v.
Hirschi, 134 Tex. 415, 136 S.W.2d 583 (1940); Ray v. Metzger, 165 S.W.2d 207 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1942), a]f'd, 141 Tex. 372, 172 S.W.2d 480 (1943).
768. See, e.g., Texas Land & Loan Co. v. Blalock, 76 Tex. 85, 13 S.W. 12 (1890).
769. See, e.g., Hughes v. Wruble, 131 Tex. 444, 116 S.W.2d 368 (1938).
770. Lincoln v. Bennett, 138 Tex. 56, 61, 156 S.W.2d 504, 506 (1943); Nixon v.
Hirschi, 134 Tex. 415, 418, 136 S.W.2d 583, 584 (1940); Ray v. Metzger, 165 S.W.2d
207, 209 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1942), a! 'd, 141 Tex. 372, 172 S.W.2d 480
(1943).
771. See, e.g., Nixon v. Hirschi, 134 Tex. 415, 136 S.W.2d 583 (1940); First Nat'l
Bank v. Solis, 137 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1940, writ ref'd); Wooten v.
Jones, 286 S.W. 680 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1926, writ dism'd).
772. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Davenport, 323 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1959, no writ).
773. See, e.g., Texas Land & Loan Co. v. Blalock, 76 Tex. 85, 13 S.W. 12 (1890).
774. Id.
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owners as their homestead, and that they resided on another lot which
was their homestead. This lot was actually vacant and had never been
used as homestead. The parties subsequently defaulted, and when the
trustee sought to foreclose on the deed of trust, the husband and wife
argued that the property was their homestead and that the deed of trust
was void because it was not for purchase money or improvements.
The Texas Supreme Court, in denying that the homestead claimants
were estopped by their statements, held that the creditor was charged
with knowledge of the fact that the mortgaged property was the only
property owned by the defendants which was adaptable to homestead
purposes. 75 Thus, the mortgaged property was their homestead as a
7 76
matter of law despite their declarations to the contrary.
Illustrative of the third situation is Hughes v. Wruble. 77 7 In Hughes
the husband and wife moved to Fort Worth and bought a home there
for the purpose of living in Forth Worth and sending their children to
school there, but they also continued to retain a lot in Graham with
a home and improvements. They mortgaged their Fort Worth property, representing that they were only temporarily occupying that home
and claiming the Graham property as their homestead. When the defendant attempted to foreclose on the Fort Worth property, however,
the Hughes claimed it was their homestead and therefore exempt from
forced sale. The supreme court held that the defendant was justified
in relying on the Hughes' statements in mortgaging the Fort Worth
property because these declarations were not inconsistent with the
visible situation at the time of the encumbrance. 778 Thus, when the
claimants own two pieces of property of which either could be considered homestead, designation by the claimants of one residence constitutes an abandonment of the other property as the homestead.
Unusual Circumstances
The Family Code refers to certain situations dealing with management of community property as "unusual. ' 779 These are generally
situations in which the marriage is undergoing some form of break775. Id. at 89, 13 S.W. at 13.
776. The supreme court has held under similar circumstances that the same decision
will be reached if it is only the husband who makes such disclaimers and declarations
to the creditor. Lincoln v. Bennett, 138 Tex. 56, 62, 156 S.W.2d 504, 507 (1941).
777. 131 Tex. 444, 116 S.W.2d 368 (1938).
778. Id. at 449, 116 S.W.2d at 370.
779. TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 5.25 (1975).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol7/iss1/10

12

Archer: Community Property and the Homestead Student Symposium - Texas La

STUDENT SYMPOSIUM

1975]

down. 7 ° As a result, one spouse may be allowed to manage that portion of the community property which would ordinarily be subject to
the sole management and control of the other spouse. In order to obtain this control, the remaining spouse must petition the district court,
stating his or her reasons.7 8 ' After hearing the evidence the court will
enter an order describing how this property should be managed. 78 2 It
must be noted, however, that the court's jurisdiction over the matter
is continuing, and it may amend or vacate the order if the circumstances
78 3
change.
The Family Code also provides for situations in which one spouse
may petition to be allowed to convey either the separate homestead
78 4
or community homestead without the joinder of the other spouse.
These unusual circumstances include insanity, disappearance, and
abandonment.
As early as 1856, Texas courts had held that a wife could convey
the community homestead without the joinder of her husband after he
had abandoned her. In Fullerton v. Doylers5 the husband abandoned
his wife and gave nothing for her support. The homestead constituted
their only community property, and in order to support her family,
the wife contracted to sell it. After making the initial down payment,
the buyer defaulted in his performance and tried to avoid the contract.
His argument was that a married woman could not convey good title
to the property. The court held, however, that the "assent of the partner who abandons the home and family and duties and powers of the
marriage relation is not requisite to the sale of the homestead." 786
780. For example in Ross v. Tidewater Oil Co., 136 Tex. 66, 145 S.W.2d 1089

(1941 ), a case decided when the husband was the sole manager of the community estate,
Falvie Ross brought suit to cancel three deeds to various tracts of land. Charlie Ross,
her husband, was insane at the time of these conveyances.

Falvie Ross contended that

a married woman, living with her insane husband, could not convey title to her separate

estate. Affirming the decision of the court of civil appeals, the Texas Supreme Court
held that Article 4617 of the Revised Civil Statutes authorized the wife to convey her
separate property when the husband is insane or has permanently abandoned the wife.

For examples of earlier case law see Zimpleman v. Robb, 53 Tex. 274 (1880) (power
of abandoned wife to manage the community estate); Masterson v. Bouldin, 151 S.W.2d
301 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1941, writ ref'd) (power of wife to manage community

estate when permanently separated from her husband).
781.

TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 5.25(a) (1974).

From 1879 until 1893, absent fam-

ily necessity, the wife, where the husband was insane, could not dispose of the community property unless she qualified as the husband's guardian. Heidenheimer v. Thomas,
63 Tex. 287 (1885).
782. TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 5.25(f) (1974).
783.

Id.

§ 5.25(g).

784. Id. §§ 5.82-5.85.
785. 18 Tex. 3 (1856).
786. Id. at 14.
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CONCLUSION

Due to the many reform movements, culminating in the enactment
of the Family Code the married woman in Texas has attained an equal
status with her husband. Nevertheless, inequitable situations may still
result in certain situations involving the homestead property. To
remedy this matter, it should be established that the homestead exemption cannot be lost except by strict adherence with the law, that joinder
of the spouses is required for the conveyance, abandonment, or encumbrance of the homestead property.
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